In the Cypriot trilogy Isocrates does not intend to carry out only an oratorical exercise on his conception of the monarchic regime. These are speeches whose primary meaning was to carry out a diplomatic action whose intention was for Cyprus to support the Athenian hegemonic cause. They were written at the precise moment when Timotheus travelled through the Aegean Sea and the north of Greece in order to consolidate Athenian expansionism. In this way, he made a sequence of political speeches (...) in which he used his own philosophical notions adapting them, on the one hand, to the Cypriot political situation characterized by confrontations between the pro-Hellenic and pro-Persian factions and, on the other hand, to the strategic needs of Athens. (shrink)

Se ha sostenido tradicionalmente que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas son análogos. Pero, ¿qué es la analogía? Varios filósofos han pensado que la analogía debe ser considerada como una forma de ambigüedad. Argumentamos aquí que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas no son ambiguos o vagos. Siguiendo algunas sugerencias de McDaniel, proponemos una concepción de la analogía donde el fenómeno semántico está asociado con el carácter más o menos natural de la propiedad o (...) propiedades que instancian las entidades que satisfacen el predicado análogo. Un predicado "θ" es análogo si y sólo si, la propiedad Θ, que algo instancia, si y sólo si es θ, es menos natural que cualquier propiedad Ξ tal que todo lo que instancie Ξ, instancia Θ. Además, se requiere que las entidades de las cuales el término análogo es predicado deban ser ontológica o epistémicamente dependientes unas de otras. || It has been traditionally sustained that predicates attributed to God and to the creatures are analogical predicates. But, what is analogy? Several philosophers have thought that analogy should be taken as a form of ambiguity. Here we argue that predicates attributed to God and to creatures are neither ambiguous nor vague. Following some suggestions given by McDaniel, we propose a view of analogy in which the semantic phenomenon is associated with the more or less natural character of the property or properties that the entities that satisfy the analogous predicate instantiate. A predicate "θ" is analogous if and only if the property Θ, which something instantiates, if and only if it is θ, is less natural that any property Ξ so that anything that instantiates Ξ, instantiates Θ. Furthermore, it is required that the entities of which the analogous term is predicated should be either ontologically or epistemically dependent on each other. (shrink)

This study was designed to survey the extent to which private companies in Sweden take structural measures within the field of business ethics: Codes of Ethics; Ethics Committees; Ethics Officers and Ethics Training. This was done in two steps. Through a nation-wide telephone survey, a population of "active" companies were identified. These companies received a questionnaire with detailed questions regarding the design, usage and effects of these measures. The percentage of active companies were found to be a high 46%. National (...) and industry characteristics are proposed as explanatory factors. (shrink)

The ethical criticism of art has recently begun to address the subject of immoral artists, with two questions seeming to dominate discussion. How does moral misconduct on the part of artists affect their work’s aesthetic value? How should the art world respond to cases of artists who have been accused of morally outrageous behaviour? Such value and policy debates are important, but they leave aside a pressing question towards which this article proposes a reorientation: What is the possible impact of (...) an artist’s moral ill repute on how we understand the meaning of their work? I argue in this paper that an artist’s bad moral reputation can lead (i) to participatory resistance to an art work, as viewers abstain from a response to the work’s illocutionary force, (ii) to the isolation of the work from the ‘quality context’ that normally allows propositions expressed by the work to be taken as sincere, (iii) to the reinterpretation of the work’s propositional content against the background of new knowledge about the author, and (iv) to the perception of the work as a lie. To illustrate, I look at works by Chuck Close and Jan Fabre, contemporary artists whose reputation has been affected by a scandal. (shrink)

Humanitarian operations may pose challenges to which armed forces prepared for warfighting seem rather ill-equipped. It is the aim of this article to examine in what way military ethics should be adapted to humanitarian tasks. Two ideal types of military ethics are defined here: warfighting and humanitarian. The warfighting ethic is supposed to maximise the utility of the military in war and combat and to that end utilises the virtues of loyalty and honour. In contrast, humanitarian obligations require to a (...) larger extent the development of personal integrity and an ability to follow one’s own conscience. The adaptation of military ethics is demonstrated in the case studies of the UK armed forces and the German Bundeswehr. Whereas the moral code of the UK armed forces remains anchored in the principles of the warfighting ethic, the case of the Bundeswehr presents a military ethic closely approximating the humanitarian ideal type. (shrink)

Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...) in epistemology, I will show that most of these initially plausible principles are false, spoiling the arguments that rely on them. And we will see that each argument threatens only one popular view of moral psychology: a “Representationalist” view on which our moral judgments rely crucially on a mental intermediary—e.g. a sentiment, gut reaction, or affect-laden intuition—delivered by our evolved moral faculty. In the end, only one evolutionary debunking argument remains a menace: an “ Argument from Symmetry ” that I will introduce to the literature. But we will see that it should worry only all naturalists, pressuring them into a trilemma: give up moral realism, accept a rationalism that is incongruous with naturalism, or give up naturalism. Non-naturalists are free and clear. (shrink)

Tomas Abraham inicia una pesquisa filosofica y no se detiene ante las impugnaciones que dictan el buen gusto y la conveniencia (la que esconde las contradicciones para simular seriedad y rigor intelectual). Nada lo detiene. Observa, analiza, compulsa. Sus preguntas no interrogan esas zonas del discurso para las cuales se han inventado ya benevolas excusas, sino las otras, las peligrosas.Desde 1989, reflexiona Abraham, el factor economico es la clave que permite descifrar los anhelos y las frustraciones de la sociedad. Por (...) que? Porque el factor economico no se reduce a la economia, no se limita a la produccion y a la distribucion de riquezas sino que acusa la visible emergencia de nuevas formas de vida. El factor economico revela el diagrama de las mutaciones culturales. En este ensayo filosofico en el que coexisten una cantidad asombrosa de estilos y tonos, el autor analiza y discute la empresa como nuevo monumento cultural, la demonizacion del estado, las batallas etico-politicas entre intelectuales y economistas culturales, la tarea de los expertos en calidad de vida y su funcion en una nueva sociedad terapeutica. De las historias de vida de los archimillonarios al encuadre historico de la ideologia empresarial, de la puesta en sorna (con el mayor respeto) de la literatura de autoayuda a la meditacion sobre la moral y el dolor en los campos de exterminio, La empresa de vivir, como los libros anteriores del autor, traza una linea osada y firme e incorpora al pensamiento argentino una nueva manera de hacer las cosas. Una nueva manera capaz de abrir discusiones aparentemente concluidas o censuradas, de expandir los efectos de un conflicto intelectual hacia areas desprestigiadas oignoradas, de inaugurar una pasion para abolir la ironia autoindulgente y los entredichos ufan. (shrink)

This study deals with the failure of one of the most advanced chatbots called Tay, created by Microsoft. Many users, commentators and experts strongly anthropomorphised this chatbot in their assessment of the case around Tay. This view is so widespread that we can identify it as a certain typical cognitive distortion or bias. This study presents a summary of facts concerning the Tay case, collaborative perspectives from eminent experts: Tay did not mean anything by its morally objectionable statements because, in (...) principle, it was not able to think; the controversial content spread by this AI was interpreted incorrectly—not as a mere compilation of meaning, but as its disclosure; even though chatbots are not members of the symbolic order of spatiotemporal relations of the human world, we treat them in this way in many aspects. (shrink)

According to the standard reading of Anselm’s De casu diaboli 12 through 14, the angels are morally responsible only if their own wills are in a radical way within their own power. By giving to angels two wills, i.e., two basic inclinations or volitional dispositions, Anselm’s God yields to the angels room for a free choice—indeed imparts on them the necessity of such a choice: in the case where an angel’s own happiness is incommensurable with justice, the angel must choose (...) or “will” which disposition to act in accordance with. The standard reading thus takes Anselm to argue for a form of voluntarism. In this paper I argue that the underlying moral psychology of De casu diaboli is neither voluntarist nor intellectualist. A voluntarist reading renders Anselm’s views on motivation incoherent, whereas his views on the conditions of morally right action run afoul of crucial intellectualist assumptions. (shrink)

Tento článek analyzuje problém normativity morálky. Argumentuji, že morálka nás normativně omezuje ve veřejném prostoru důvodů. Některá jednání jsou v dané společenské praxi poskytování a požadování morálních důvodů neobhajitelná. Morální zdůvodňování je zdůvodňováním v pojmech obecných principů s ideou férové nestrannosti k zájmům všech dotčených osob. Morální svědomí nemá nezávislý normativní význam. Normativní síla svědomí je odvozená od presumované způsobilosti morálních principů na jeho pozadí být ospravedlněné v (hypoteticky ideálním) veřejném prostoru důvodů.This paper analyses the problem of normativity of morality. (...) I argue that morality restricts us normatively in the public space of reasons. Some actions are indefensible in the social praxis of giving and asking for moral reasons. Moral reasoning is a reasoning in terms of general principles with the idea of fair impartiality to interests of all affected persons. The moral conscience has not an independent normative significance. The normative force of moral conscience is derivatedly related to the presumptive capability of the moral principles in its background to be justified in the (hypothetically ideal) public space of reasons. (shrink)

The latest philosophy of P. Ricoeur offers us the opportunity to articulate an ethic applied responsive to the challenges of our time. This proposal is basically collected in his book The fair 2, a compilation of work and consolidating core issues of practical philosophy. Part of an original sense of justice where "the rightthing" does not arise as a name or abstract category, but as a sustantivated adjective. This is not an abstract value but a value whose scope, accuracy and (...) meaning depends on its realization in the unity of human life. Retrieving the original sense already appeared in the Socratic dialogues of Plato, as just described, defines and conducts the practice of justice. This analysis is productive in applied ethics because it raises the "implementation" of an original and original is not a post or outside the foundation, but an exercise in interpretation and philosophical creativity morality. By understanding and applied ethics, through what we find just the issues central to the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: an anthropology of the human being capable, a hermeneutics of action and imagination, a reconstruction of the history of practical philosophy, and also an ethic of fair distance. (shrink)

Whether regarded as a perplexing object, a morally captivating force, an ineffable entity beyond language, or an inescapably embodied human practice, music has captured philosophically inclined minds since time immemorial. In turn, musicians of all stripes have called on philosophy as a source of inspiration and encouragement, and scholars of music through the ages have turned to philosophy for insight into music and into the worlds that sustain it. In this Handbook, contributors build on this legacy to conceptualize the rich (...) interactions of Western music and philosophy as a series of meeting points between two vital spheres of human activity. They draw together key debates at the intersection of music studies and philosophy, offering a field-defining overview while also forging new paths. Chapters cover a wide range of musics and philosophies, including concert, popular, jazz, and electronic musics, and both analytic and continental philosophy. (shrink)

This paper traces the distinction between the claims of love and the claims of morality in the work of Raimond Gaita, and disputes it using examples from Gaita’s work – particularly his use of “decency” in place of morality – which I try to understand better through this scrutiny. I disclose in Gaita’s work the tension between highlighting love and praise of decency and I try to show that the tension between love and decency indeed remains present in his writing, (...) but not as a contrariness of claims from both departments. Though they constitute two different claims, their mixture is imaginable and valuable even if, by taking part in it, the sense of both love and decency changes, which, however, might be seen as an opportunity to open new horizons for working both of them into human life. (shrink)

Every corporation has an economic and moral responsibility to its stockholders to perform well financially. However, the number of bankruptcies in Slovakia has been growing for several years without an apparent macroeconomic cause. To prevent a rapid denigration and to prevent the outflow of foreign capital, various efforts are being zealously implemented. Robust analysis using conventional bankruptcy prediction tools revealed that the existing models are adaptable to local conditions, particularly local legislation. Furthermore, it was confirmed that most of these outdated (...) tools have sufficient capability to warn of impending financial problems several years in advance. A novel bankruptcy prediction tool that outperforms the conventional models was developed. However, it is increasingly challenging to predict bankruptcy risk as corporations have become more global and more complex and as they have developed sophisticated schemes to hide their actual situations under the guise of “optimization” for tax authorities. Nevertheless, scepticism remains because economic engineers have established bankruptcy as a strategy to limit the liability resulting from court-imposed penalties. (shrink)

Conceptualization and measurement of organizational commitment involve different dimensions that include economic, affective, as well as moral aspects labelled in the literature as: ‘continuance’, ‘affective’ and ‘normative’ commitment. This multidimensional framework emerges from the convergence of different research lines. Using Aristotle’s philosophical framework, that explicitly considers the role of the will in human commitment, it is proposed a rational explanation of the existence of mentioned dimensions in organizational commitment. Such a theoretical proposal may offer a more accurate definition of ‘affective (...) commitment’ that distinguishes feelings from rational judgments. The use of a philosophical explanation coherent with psychological findings also allows the discovery of a wider moral concept of ‘normative commitment’. (shrink)

Is it possible to look at schools as spaces for encounters? Could schools contribute to a deliberative mode of communication in a manner better suited to our own time and to areas where different cultures meet? Inspired primarily by classical (Dewey) and modern (Habermas) pragmatists, I turn to Seyla Benhabib, posing the question whether she supports the proposition that schools can be sites for deliberative communication. I argue that a school that engages in deliberative communication, with its stress on mutual (...) communication between different moral perspectives, gives universalism a procedurally oriented meaning, serving as an arena for encounters that represents a weak public sphere. An interactive universalism of this kind attaches importance to developing an ability and willingness to reason on the basis of the views of others and to change perspectives. In that respect, the institutional arrangements of schools are potential parts of the political dimension of cosmopolitanism, as well as its moral dimension, in terms of the obligations and responsibilities we develop through our institutions and in our actions as human beings towards one another. (shrink)

The main goal of my text is to generalize Alexy's explicative argument against human rights skeptics in order to minimize the overall room for their escape. This argument tries to show that any attempt to intersubjectively justify the nonexistence of human rights as moral rights necessarily commits the so‐called performative self‐contradiction. Alexy worries that the effect of his argument can be weakened by a group reduction of discourse. But I will argue that this worry is overstated because the price of (...) such a reduction is much higher than Alexy estimates. I will then turn to the issue of moral relativism. I will try to show that the explicative argument, if suitably generalized, can cope even with human rights skeptics who think in terms of moral relativism. (shrink)

Anselm of Canterbury holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu (...) diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3,... (shrink)

[Charles Darwin, Philosopher for the 21st Century] This is, by and large, a review paper which discusses the current situation and future prospects of a philosophy based on the Darwinian view of life. The first section reflects on Wittgenstein's aversion to Darwinism, which was a symptom of his construal of philosophy as conceptual analysis free from empirical inquiry. The contemporary turn to Darwinian considerations in philosophy is a consequence of the Quinean rejection of conceptual analysis in favour of a continuity (...) between philosophy and empirical science. The second section synthesizes some recent views on the character of Darwin's theory -- the structure of his argument and the evidence for his premises. The third section moves on to a Darwinian epistemology, where the main contention concerns the possibility of deriving epistemic norms from evolutionary history. Appeals to evolution in an attempt to account for the possibility of misrepresentation and the debate over original versus derived intentionality both play a central role in philosophy of mind, explored in the fourth section. Finally, the fifth section turns to ethics, in particular a recent research into the evolutionary origins of moral behaviour. (shrink)

Cílem této studie je analyzovat emoční manipulaci jako etický problém. Nejprve budu mluvit o emotivismu, což je metaetická teorie, která je oblíbeným terčem kritiky, protože v pojmech emotivismu se těžko rozlišuje morální argumentace od propagandy. Potom proberu samotný pojem manipulace a ukážu nějaké příklady. Manipulace je eticky problematický způsob ovlivňování chování druhého člověka, a to zejména proto, že nerespektuje jeho osobní autonomii. Emoční manipulace je ale docela spletitá záležitost, protože emoční angažovanost nemusí podkopávat osobní autonomii jednotlivce.

This article explores recent developments inthe regulation of Internet speech, inparticular, injurious or defamatory speech andthe impact the attempts at regulation arehaving on the `body' in the sense of theindividual person who speaks through the mediumof the Internet and upon those harmed by thatspeech. The article proceeds in threesections. First, a brief history of the legalattempts to regulate defamatory Internet speechin the United States is presented; a shortcomparative discussion of defamation law in theUK and Australia is included. As discussedbelow, this (...) regulation has altered thetraditional legal paradigm of responsibilityand, as a result, creates potential problems forthe future of unrestricted and even anonymousspeech on the Internet. Second, an ethicalassessment is made of the defamatory speechenvironment in order to determine which actorshave moral responsibility for the harm causedby defamatory speech. This moral assessment iscompared to the developing and anticipatedlegal paradigm to identify possible conformityof moral and legal tenants or to recognize theconflict between morality and law in assigningresponsibility to defamatory actors. Thisassessment then concludes with possiblesuggestions for changes in the legal climategoverning the regulation of defamatory speechon the Internet, as well as prediction of theresult should the legal climate continue todevelop on its present course. This is not tosuggest that all law, or even the law ofdefamation, be structured to reflect thesubjectivity of a moral construct, but since itis the authors position that the legalassignment of liability in online settings ismisaligned, this reflection can serve asbeginning reassessment of that assignment. (shrink)

This paper develops some of Austin’s ideas on excuses, stressing their “dimensional” character and relating it to Searle’s distinction between intention-in-action and previous intention, in order to show that the original speech-act shaped distinction between weakness of the will and moral weakness can be embedded in a quite different theoretical framework such as Davidson’s, while Austin’s dimensional classification of actions cannot. Finally, the article analyzes how Grice’s critique of Davidson’s views on akrasia is more faithful to Austin and more radical (...) in its conclusions concerning the justificatory aspect of reasons and the rational features of action. (shrink)

The paper shows the necessity to return to the origins and the true object of political science in order to obtain a new and better understanding of the key phenomena in the realm of politics, especially that of the 20th century. The classical view of “humanities” is treated as opposed to the “positivist” tradition based on the power of technology and applying the methodology and the criteria analogical to those of natural sciences. The author emphasizes the moral and interpersonal character (...) of the distinctively human world of institutions, culture, ethics and politics. In order to understand the special character of the object of political science, a reconsideration of the classical traditions in political and moral philosophy as well as a new philosophical anthropology is necessary. (shrink)

[For an Ethics without Theology] This study is a critical reflection on Marek Vácha's article on the ethics of euthanasia. In the first part the author offers a short consideration of the reasons for the moribund state of ethics in Czech philosophy, after which, in the second part, he presents a critique of Vácha's article. The article in question is, above all, lacking in a philosophical approach to the problem of euthanasia, and we find in it not so much arguments (...) as rhetoric. The only line of argument that is detectable in the article is founded on natural theology, something that Vácha elsewhere repudiates, and it offers the reader a false dilemma between accepting theistic ethics on the one hand or total subjectivism on the other. In reality, of course, there is a wide range of kinds of objective secular ethics. In the third part, one of these forms is summarised--a system of "everyday morality" which is founded on the concept of harm, and which treats conduct as immoral primarily when it causes unjustifiable harm to others. This form of ethics does not presuppose any controversial theory of value, and it constitutes the viewpoint from which the author then defends physician-assisted suicide. A doctor who helps a patient die--or who causes the patient's death on his own request--does not cause that individual harm if she has only a period of life filled with pain left. In conclusion the author indentifies certain points of contact between secular and theistic ethics. (shrink)

In this article, the concept of moralistic fallacy introduced by B. D. Davis is elaborated on in more detail. The main features of this fallacy are discussed, and its general form is presented. The moralistic fallacy might have some undesirable outcomes. Some of them might even be in direct conflict to the original moral position. If this occurs, it is possible to characterize it as a paradox of moralistic fallacy. The possibility of this paradox provides a further reason not to (...) prevent any scientific inquiries and not to depict any knowledge as dangerous. (shrink)

Studie recenzuje díla: Sam HARRIS, The Moral Landscape a Patricia Smith CHURCHLAND, Braintrust. Cílem recenzní stati je vyzdvihnout hlubokou shodu v naturalistickém pojetí etiky u obou autorů a upozornit na některé nedostatky jejich argumentace.

El propósito de este artículo es estudiar la actualidad del binomio persona-naturaleza para fundamentar la unión hipostática de acuerdo con el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino. Ambos conceptos se necesitan mutuamente no sólo como la parte y el todo para fundar una Metafísica de la Encarnación, sino también para poder predicar las naturalezas del único supuesto de modo de no destruir la unidad personal de Cristo. De este modo, para el Aquinate, persona y naturaleza no sólo expresan nociones metafísicas, (...) sino también conceptos que se predican del único supuesto subsistente. (shrink)

Many reports independently confirm that even more than a quarter of a century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the results of research and development in those countries that were under its influence are insufficient in comparison to the rest of the world. Given that human intelligence is not distributed unevenly and that science is a powerful driving force for the future of an economy, there is a hidden problem, which, if it can be resolved, may release great economic (...) potential. The first generation of researchers from Armenia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Slovakia and Ukraine, who successfully completed their education after the political revolution, were surveyed. The survey revealed many similarities with regards to ethics, but that there is mounting evidence that the main cause of the current situation is the state of the local legal systems. The conclusion was drawn that a conceptual change in staffing within the relevant legal systems is required to release potential and stimulate wealth creation. (shrink)

Este trabajo profundiza en la legitimación teológica perversa que el falso místico hace de sus actos sexuales. Con tal propósito, se hace una introducción histórica a las prácticas sexuales de carácter gnóstico y se considera el juego discursivo ambiguo entre lo exotérico y esotérico. Como ejemplo, se analizan algunas ambigüedades textuales en la obra de Javier Garrido OFM (condenado canónicamente por “falso misticismo”), a la luz de la investigación sobre los abusos sexuales de los hermanos Philippe OP y Jean Vanier. (...) Asimismo, se exploran tres coincidencias con ideas ajenas al cristianismo que divinizan la pulsión sexual. Y se concluye apelando al discernimiento y la prudencia sobre el lenguaje místico-esponsal, y a la claridad en la moral sexual. (shrink)